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Anthropocentrism and the Continental Tradition: Calarco’s Zoographies
Matthew Calarco, Zoographies: The Question of the Animal from Heidegger to Derrida. 
New York: Columbia University Press, 2008. 169 pages.
Zoographies is primarily a critical book: one of its main claims is that Continental philoso-
phy has been (and is) anthropocentric. Even though well-known thinkers such as Heide-
gger do ask the question of the animal (i.e., what constitutes the being of the animal, or 
what is animality?), Calarco argues that their question is always preceded by the unques-
tioned priority of the human being. The main argument of Zoographies is that we should 
“simply let the human-animal distinction go, or, at the very least, not insist on maintaining 
it” (p. 149). Calarco finds hope in Heidegger, Levinas, Agamben, and Derrida, yet all these 
philosophers can be accused of anthropocentrism and thus of reinforcing boundaries. 
For me, one of the most interesting parts of the book is the introduction. Here Calarco 
clearly explains the aim of his project by contrasting it with the writings of, among others, 
Tom Regan, whose “work is not a case for animal rights but for rights for subjects, the clas-
sical example of which is human beings” (p. 8). Calarco instead wants to move beyond the 
anthropomorphism of the universal (such as a shared subjectivity that always leads to exclu-
sion) and develop an ethics that moves beyond the perspective of the human being. He 
reads Heidegger et al. within the context of this idea. While he shows that the philosophers 
he discusses may be anthropocentric, he traces certain routes to overcoming that anthropo-
centrism in the works of Heidegger, Levinas, Agamben, and Derrida—albeit in quite dif-
ferent ways for each thinker. 
The first chapter discusses Heidegger. The textual analysis is thorough (as is true through-
out the book) and starts with a brief discussion of Being and Time. Calarco guides the 
reader (including the reader who is unfamiliar with Heidegger’s work), while simultane-
ously setting up the context of Heidegger’s anthropomorphism. The latter is found particu-
larly in Heidegger’s 1929/1930 lecture course, The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics: 
World, Finitude, Solitude. Calarco here exposes a theme that will recur throughout the 
book: philosophers (Heidegger, Agamben, and Derrida) attempt to overcome anthropo-
centrism, yet ultimately fail to do so. Ironically, Heidegger asks the question of the ani-
mal—i.e., he attempts to discuss the animal in nonanthropocentric terms—but he merely 
shifts to a new anthropocentric discourse. When Heidegger describes the animal as “poor 
in world,” he may have found a new way to describe the animal world, but this new descrip-
tion is anthropocentric nonetheless: the animal is “poor” in comparison to us. 
The second chapter discusses Levinas, whose work is, as the book points out, often 
plagued by “idiosyncratic anthropocentric dogmatism” (p. 14). Despite this dogmatism, 
Levinas’s thought has the potential to open up a radicalized animal ethics. Thus Calarco 
finds an interesting contradiction at the heart of Levinas’s philosophy: it is dogmatically 
anthropocentric, while “the underlying logic of his thought permits no such anthropocen-
trism” (p. 55). 
Agamben is the third philosopher discussed in the book. Agamben’s work seems promis-
ing for Calarco’s project since he wants to abandon the human-animal distinction at the 
political and the ontological level. Starting from the category of bare life, a new form of the 
political emerges that should include the animal. In this new political life, Agamben tries 
to “jam” the anthropological machine, the mechanism that determines the current human-
animal distinction in philosophical discourses. Yet, as with Heidegger (and Derrida), his 
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attempt to overcome anthropocentrism is ultimately a failure: Agamben “jams” the anthro-
pological machine from the standpoint of the human being without ever asking what the 
impact is on animal life. 
In his last chapter, Calarco discusses Derrida and his attempt to overcome and move 
beyond boundaries in general and the human-animal distinction in particular. Calarco 
explains the aim of deconstruction as reworking boundaries “so as to overcome them and 
think through and beyond them” (p. 132). For the question of the animal this is particu-
larly important since it would move us beyond the ethical theories of Singer and Regan, 
which simply move the existing boundaries; in those theories, ethical communities are 
extended to sentient beings, or to subjects-of-a-life. While Singer and Regan have done 
important work, Calarco shows the limitations of their ideas and argues, using Derrida, 
that we should move beyond boundaries. This last chapter argues how, on the one hand, 
deconstruction for Derrida implies vegetarianism and how, in the end, Derrida falls back in 
the anthropocentric tradition by describing an abyss between the human and the animal.
One of the main achievements of Zoographies is to explain in clear language philosophers 
such as Derrida—whose language is often regarded as an impediment—thereby making 
them more accessible to readers who are not schooled in their thought or in Continental 
philosophy. 
Calarco takes up the double task of criticizing and evaluating the value of the four think-
ers for rethinking the question of the animal. Yet each chapter criticizes the anthropocen-
trism of each of these philosophers. While I am very sympathetic to the overall project, 
after reading this book it remains unclear to me precisely what Calarco’s move beyond 
boundaries means. It is even doubtful whether Heidegger and the other philosophers discussed 
are even helpful in this project, considering the book’s severe criticism of them. I would 
have liked Calarco to return to the ideas presented in the introduction, where he hints that 
he wants to move beyond universality (such as the notion of a subject). Those interesting 
and provocative ideas are to some degree lost in the critical readings of the four thinkers. 
Related to this criticism are my reservations about the selection of these four philoso-
phers. I am not convinced, for example, that the chapter on Heidegger is essential to the 
main argument. Other important Continental philosophers are missing or are found only 
in the margins. Deleuze, for instance, is identified in the introduction as a very important 
figure for the project, yet in the remainder of the text his name is hardly mentioned. 
I would have liked to read more about his importance.
Criticisms aside, I found this an interesting work that I enjoyed reading. Zoographies is a 
thorough study of some of the main figures of contemporary Continental philosophy, yet 
it is also accessible to readers who are less familiar with this tradition.
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